feeling: vedanā (q.v.); further s. khandha. - Contemplation of f.: vedanānupassanā; s. Satipaṭṭhāna.
Feeling. The terms "feeling" and "to feel" are used in a large variety of ways and often very vaguely, not least in religious discourse, in which their use can be confusing or worse. I can be said to feel a velvety sensation in my hand or a pain in my colon; I can feel angry or sick or bored or insulted or unable to move or that something strange is going to happen or that you hate me or even that there is a ghost in the room. Is "I feel angry" distinguishable from "I am angry"? Philosophic discussions on the subject of feeling focus principally on how feelings can be identified and described and distinguished from one another. Is our knowledge of the world attained through feelings and if so to what extent? I feel what I call a toothache and it is painful to my consciousness, but does the feeling correspond to a state of affairs independently of my awareness? If we say it does, how are we to account for hypochondriac reports as when I claim that I feel a toothache only when I see my mother-in-law? Only I can feel my "own" pain; how then can I rely on your word that you have a pain, let alone sympathize with you in having it? You may feign both pain and pleasure with dramatic skill. Moreover, the fact that one feels pain or pleasure is not in itself any warranty for anything beyond the fact that one feels it. When one relates, however honestly, that one felt delicious shivers down one's back at a religious meeting, one's hearers cannot be justified in deducing any more than that account says. If the reporter deduces more, then some reason or circumstance other than feeling is necessary to warrant any such further claim. To use feeling as the calculus of the religious value or importance of an experience is as misguided as basing the validity of an argument on the pleasure one may derive from listening to its being propounded. Historically, both feeling" and "passion" have been understood in a variety of ways, depending on the philosophical system underlying their use. For example, Descartes, as a rationalist, sees the passions as modes of the "thinking substance" while Condillac, as an empiricist, seeks to derive everything in human experience from sensation.
In Buddhist thought, feeling (vedanā) is one of five primary groups of aggregates (skandhas) into which human personality is divided. In this sort of literature, feeling is subdivided in various ways, e.g., the physically agreeable/ disagreeable and the mentally agreeable/ disagreeable.
feeling : (f.) vedanā; dayā; anukampā; saññā. (nt.) anubhavana; phusana; parāmasana. (adj.) sacetana; paṭisaṃvedī.
sdug bsngal
[translation-san] {LCh,C,MSA,MV} duḥkha
[translation-san] {C} duḥkhita
[translation-san] {C} duḥkhi
[translation-san] {MV} duḥkhana
[translation-san] {MSA} duḥkhatā
[translation-san] {MSA} duḥkhita
[translation-san] {C} roga
[translation-san] {C} vedanā
[translation-eng] {Hopkins} suffering; pain
[translation-eng] {C} misery; torment; discomfort; feeling; sickness; disease; sorry; painful; ailing; miserable