Soul. The concept of a soul as representing an element in man other than that which is empirically observable occurs in one way or another in virtually all religions from the most primitive to the most developed. In primitive Semitic thought the word nepeš (Arabic nafs) is usually but misleadingly translated into English as "soul;" but "soul" as generally used today includes a variety of ideas, mostly from Greek thought and medieval extrapolation of it, that would have been alien to the Semitic way of understanding man. The nepeš as mentioned in Genesis 2.7 might indeed be better rendered "life" than "soul." The nepeš in that mode of thought is really life. Connected with the primitive notion of a fine diminutive replica of the body, which it inhabits, it escapes at death, normally through the mouth or nostrils, although possibly on the point of the sword in the case of a violent death; yet it does not escape to have a life of its own, for it is the man's life. It is not life in our terms, however, so that "life" would not be a satisfactory translation either. It is, rather, life in the sense of whatever man desires or loves. It is a concept that is too simple for our now more complex minds easily to grasp. The onomatopeic Hebrew word ruaḥ, usually translated "spirit" or "breath," also suggests an ingredient in what we understand as "soul;" yet "soul" as we understand it today, whether to affirm or deny its existence, is deeply rooted in Platonic and other Greek thought in which psychē might come closer to our idea of "soul." Nevertheless, both in the Old Testament and the New Testament psychē is used much more often in a Hebrew than in a Greek sense.

From sources in Greek philosophy and Gnostic thought was gradually evolved the notion of a soul as in some way or other separate from the body of a human being, not merely a spiritual principle but a finer and higher dimension in men and women. Still, even then a multitude of phrases reflect the vagueness of the term, e.g., when we say of an artistically insensitive person that he or she "has no soul" we seem to be merely denying sensitivity, not making any metaphysical or ontological statement such as one might be making if one said that a stone has no soul. The term "soul" appears, then, to be by any reckoning a vague and ambiguous one, ill adapted for serious philosophical or theological use.

Geddes MacGregor, Dictionary of Religion and Philosophy, New York: Paragon House, 1989

soul : (m.) atta; jīva || belonging to the soul: ajjhattika; attaniya.

A.P. Buddhadatta Mahathera, Concise Pali-English and English-Pali Dictionary [available as digital version from Metta Net, Sri Lanka]